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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT

IV. Adjective Law-Evidence
EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
A number of points of evidence were considered by the court
during the last term. Only the most important will here be
discussed.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
In a suit for divorce on the ground of adultery, plaintiff established that she observed her husband enter a hotel with a woman
whom she did not know, and that about an hour and a half later,
she saw him leave the hotel with the same woman. There was
an absence of any testimony showing that the two had registered
at the hotel or that they had occupied the same room. There was
some evidence which might tend to show that the hotel was
reputed to be a house of assignation, but there was none that the
principal or essential business of the establishment was not that
of conducting a hotel. The Supreme Court properly affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of the suit. Plaintiff had failed to make
a prima facie showing of adultery, and had not proved her case
by a preponderance of the evidence.'
REPUTATION
2

In State v. Johnson several of the defendant's witnesses had
testified to his "good character" in Evangeline Parish. The
Supreme Court found that there was no error in the lower court's
admission of rebuttal testimony to the effect that defendant
had a bad reputation in and around Beaumont, Texas, where
defendant had lived "for a time."
RIGHT OF PRE-TRIAL INSPECTION OF DEFENDANT TO
DOCUMENTS IN HANDS OF PROSECUTION

In 1945 the court held in State v. Dorsey 4 that a defendant's
attorney is entitled to a pre-trial inspection of his client's alleged
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Faculty Editor,
LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Massa v. Thompson, 220 La. 278, 56 So. 2d 422 (1952).
2. 220 La. 1075, 58 So. 2d 389 (1952).
3. Reversible error was found, however, in the admission of certain
fatally prejudicial testimony.
4. 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273 (1945).
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written confession. In State v. Haddad5 the court reaffirmed its
refusal to extend this rule. It denied that defense counsel had a
right to a pre-trial inspection of written confessions of codefendants, written statements of witnesses, or police reports in
the hands of the sheriff, police department, or district attorney.
DIEc

VERDICT IN LOUISIANA

6

In State v. Haddad the court stated that a motion for directed
verdict is unauthorized under our law. It should be noted, however, that Act 447 of 19507 provides for an instructed or directed
verdict in criminal proceedings, but states that the denial of such
a motion is not subject to review on appeal. In the opinion of
the writer, a motion for a directed verdict is a very convenient
and time-saving procedural device, and in his opinion, the Legislature should extend its availability to the sphere of Louisiana
civil procedure.8
SCOPE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION

On rehearing in the Haddad case 9 and after careful deliberation, the court set aside defendant's conviction, for it found that
there had been an undue restriction upon the cross-examination
of an alleged accomplice. Great latitude must be allowed in the
cross-examination of an accomplice. Although it is seldom indeed
that a trial judge will be reversed because of alleged errors committed with respect to his control of the scope of cross-examination, this is an instance in which an undue restriction might well
result in a miscarriage of justice. In the writer's opinion, the
Supreme Court's decision to set aside the conviction was altogether proper.
PRIVILEGE

Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court had
permitted the district attorney to cross-examine a defense witness
as to testimony given by him before the grand jury. The Supreme
Court held in State v. Johnson1 that no error had thereby been
committed. The court stated that the objection evidently was
5. 221 La. 337, 59 So. 2d 411 (1951).
6. Ibid.
7. La. R.S. Supp. 1950, 15:402.1.
8. For the rule governing a motion for directed verdict in civil cases in

federal court, see Rule 50, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discussed at
length in Chapter 50 of Moore's Federal Practice (2 ed. 1951).
9. State v. Haddad, 221 La. 337, 59 So. 2d 411, 420 (1952).
10. 220 La. 170, 56 So. 2d 143 (1951).
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based on a theory of privilege, but said that it knew of no rule
prohibiting the use of such testimony for impeachment purposes.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

In State v. Campbell" the court again pointed out the distinction between an admission and a confession. 12 For the state to
introduce a confession, it must first show that the statement in
question was freely and voluntarily made. 13 No such foundation
is required for an admission not involving the existence of a
criminal intent. 14 Defendant was being prosecuted for attempting to burglarize a church. A police officer testified that defendant had told him that he had broken a window pane on the
church property in order to see the caretaker, whom he had heard
was a "queer." The court held that this statement was not a confession, but an acknowledgment of a fact tending to establish
guilt, and required no preliminary showing of voluntariness.
State v. Green'1 presents a shocking example of the methods
sometimes employed by our legal authorities to extract confessions. Defendant's conviction of murder was set aside, for it had
not been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the confessions
introduced had in no way been induced by the physical and
mental coercion previously administered.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INcRIMrINATION

In State v. Brown 0 the court restated the well-known proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination is the privilege
of the witness and purely personal to himself. Although fully
apprised of his rights, the witness in the instant case made no
objection to answering the questions asked. The Supreme Court
held that it was reversible error for the trial judge to order the
witness not to reply and to relieve him from testifying.
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED

EVIDENCE

The Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that illegally
obtained evidence is admissible in the state courts of Louisiana."7
And the court held that this general rule was applicable to the
11.
12.
13.
14.

219 La. 1040, 55 So. 2d 238 (1951).
See La. R.S. 1950, 15:449.
La. R.S. 1950, 15:451.
La. R.S. 1950, 15:454.

15. 60 So. 2d 208 (La. 1952). For a more detailed treatment of this case,
see pp. 292-293.
16. 221 La. 394, 59 So. 2d 431 (1952).

17. State v. Mastricovo, 221 La. 312, 59 So. 2d 403 (1952).
discussion of this case, see pp. 293-294.

For a further
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circumstances of the instant case, even though here an agent of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had accompanied the arresting
officers, and here the conduct charged might also have violated
a federal statute on the same subject. Illegally obtained evidence
is inadmissible in federal court, and the facts of the instant case
may reflect an attempt by federal authorities to circumvent
this rule.
OPINION EVDENCE

In State v. Scott18 the court held that no opinion was involved
in the testimony of a deputy sheriff that certain tire tracks were
identical with the tread of the tires on defendant's car. This was
said to be a statement of fact within the officer's knowledge and
not the expression of an opinion. With respect to similar testimony by another witness (also a deputy sheriff), the court stated
that "[n]o special training is required of a witness to identify
the tread of tires as the same exhibited by tire imprints observed
on a road." The accuracy of the court's observations on this point
may well be questioned.
OFFICIAL DocuMENTs

In Sinagra v. Illinois Central Railroad Company 9 the court
gave a very board interpretation to R.S. 13:3713, which deals
with the proof of official records and other documents. The
court conceded that the status of prima facie evidence accorded
certain publications by that section is apparently limited to those
published by the Government Printing Office in Washington,
D.C. But consideration was given to the purpose of the section
and to the fact that many governmental agencies and departments issue printed and mimeographed matter from their local
offices. The court held that there was no error in the admission
of copies of the Market News Service bulletin.
18. 60 So. 2d 71 (La. 1952).
19. 220 La. 205, 56 So. 2d 233 (1951).

